



LIEN OF JUDGMENT-WHAT, IT BINDS
At common law lands were not affected by a judgment; but since
the Stat. Westminster 2, 18 Edward I. c. 18, as against the defend-
ant and his heirs, a judgment binds a moiety of all the freehold
land and tenements which the debtor, or any person in trust for him,
were seised of, at or after the time to which the judgment relates.'
In Pennsylvania, the whole of defendant's freehold lands which
were in his possession at the time of the judgment, are bound, but it
is well settled here, that lands which were acquired by him subse-
quently to the judgment are not affected by it, and if aliened bona
fide before execution, cannot be followed.
2
If, however, such after acquired lands bad remained in defend]-
ant's possession at the issue of execution, they would have been
subject to levy.s And, as a corollary to this proposition, it has been
held that such after acquired lands still in the possession of defend-
ant, are bound by the first of several executions, without regard to
priority among the judgments obtained before the land was pur-
chased.4 And, in Parker's Appeal 5 the principle has been legiti-
3 Comm. 418. Tidd Pr. p. 850, and cases there cited.
'Colhoun v. Snider, 6 Binn. 135. 3 Ibid.
Lea v. Hopkins, 7 Barr, 492. 5 6 Barr, 277.
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mately carried out to the extent that, an execution levied upon land
acquired after the judgment, is to be preferred to another judgment
obtained after both the purchase and the execution.
,,In the case of Colhoun vs. Snider, Justices Yates and Bracken-
ridge, the latter in a very characteristic opinion,' labored to show
that the doctrine now prevailing in England, that a judgment binds
after-acquired lands, was introduced by a series of misapprehensions
on the part of reporters and legal writers, as to the points really
decided by the courts.
Chief Justice Tilghman, however, with his usual caution, contents
himself with deciding the point, on the ground of long continued
and universal usage in Pennsylvania, sanctioned by judicial deci-
sions. He says, after citing Bundle -vs. -Etwein,2 directly to the
point, "It is certain that, in many instances, the common law of
England has been departed from in this country from a sense of
inconvenience, which has produced a silent practice not now to be
4raced to its origin. * * * There has been some difference of
apinion respecting-the cofmon law, on this point; but I have rea-
son to suppose, from a c.onversation which I once had with Judge
Smith, that both he and Chief Justice Shippen (in 1unud vs.
.Etwein) founded themselves on the understanding which had long
prevailed in this State. Be that as it may, my opinion is bottomed
,oeli., on the decisions which I have mentioned, and, therefore, I
I. Speaking of the doctrine that all freehold lands which have been in the posses-
sion of the defendant at any time since the judgment, are bound by it, he says,
"Supposing it to be the law of England, it may not be practicable to eradicate it
in that country, it having become a rule of property, and estates having passed
under it, even though upon investigation it should be evident that it has got into the
system, though it did not originally belong to it: as flies, or other insects, which
have been embodied when the gum or mineral oil was liquid, and cannot be got
out when become hard, without breaking the amber. For as the poet sBgs--
Pretty in amber, to observe the forms
Of hairs, or straws, or dirt, or grubs, or-worms;
The things.we know are neither rich nor rare,
But wonder how the devil they got there-"
2 Rundle vs. Etwein, 2 Yates, 28; Canal Co. vs. Nicholson; Pleasants vs. Boyer,
cited 6 Bin. 187.
LIEN OF JUDGMENT-WHAT IT BINDS. 515
forbear from entering into any discussion of the common law prin-
ciple."'
The case of Colhoun vs. Snider has been discussed,2 and its ope-
ration restricted to the exact point decided, viz., that land, to which
the judgment debtor had not even an inchoate title until after the
judgment was obtained, is not bound by it.
But in Pennsylvania, a judgment binds every equitable interest
which the debtor has at the time it is obtained.' Hence, since a
purchaser, under articles of agreement, acquires an equitable inte-
rest in the land, though a deed has not been executed, it follows
that this interest is bound by a judgment subsequently obtained.4
But equity looks upon things agreed to be done, as actually per-
formed, and when a contract is made for the sale of land, equity
considers the vendee as the purchaser of the estate sold, and as
trustee for the vendor of the purchase money. The moment, then,
the legal title is acquired, and the equity and the law united, the
judgment attaches and binds the united interest.6
The doctrine contained in the words of Judge Duncan is some-
what too broadly laid down, and has since been restricted. It is
now settled that the judgment attaches upon the subsequently ac-
quired title only when the subsequent acquisition is in pursuance of
the contract under which the original estate of freehold, held before
the judgment, was obtained, not when the subsequent acquisition
results from an independent contract. Thus when the owner of a
life estate, against whom a judgment exists, afterwards purchases
the fee from a different vendor, although, as regards the purchaser,
the life estate is merged in the fee, yet, as regards the interest of
.he lien creditors, it is not merged, and a judgment against the
owner of the life estate does not attach upon the fee simple, but is
o be enforced against the life estate alone.
6
But a judgment against a vendee, under articles of agreement,
binds only his equitable title, and if the legal title is subsequently
' 6 Binn. 137. 2 Richter vs. Selin, 8 S. & R. 425. s Seepost.
4 Lynch vs. Dearth, 2 Pa. R. 101; Lyon vs. McGuffey, 4 Barr, 128.
5 Per Duncan, J. in Richter vs. Selin, 8 S. & R. 425; Foster's Appeal, 3 Barr, 79
6 Denison's Appeal, 1 Barr, 201.
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acquired by him, subject to a condition in the deed for the payment
of the balance of the purchase money, the judgment, though it
attaches against the legal title, will be subordinated to the condi-
tion.1 In this case, in addition to the condition in the deed, a bond
and mortgage were given for the payment of the balance of the
purchase money, but the mortgage was not recorded until over two
years after its execution, and the deed was not recorded at all.
The land was sold under the mortgage, and the dispute was between
the vendors and creditors under judgments obtained after the exe-
cution, but before delivery of the deed, as to who were entitled to
the fund. The court held that the conveyance having been made
subject to the payment of the purchase money, this was an incum-
brance upon the title, and valid, though the mortgage might not be
so. The conclusion to which the court comes in this case, seems
inconsistent with their reasoning, unless they merely meant to de-
cide that such a condition in the deed is equivalent to a mortgage,
and not within the recording statutes, which postpone even a mort-
gage for purchase -money to subsequent judgments, if it is not re-
corded within sixty days from its date.2 On any other ground it
seems incontestible that the unpaid instalments still binding the
land, the sheriff's vendee must take it, subject to all the equities of
the judgment debtor, in whose shoes he stands, and that, therefore,
the original vendor must look to the land for the unpaid instalment,
and not to the fund. This, indeed is true in all cases of sale of
vendee's interest under the judgment of a stranger, and it has been
frequently held in such cases that the purchaser at sheriff's sale of
a vendee's interest under articles of agreement, takes precisely the
estate, and acquires all the rights which the vendee had.
3
But in the case of a sale, under a judgment of the vendor, for
the purchase money, the doctrine was originated by KeLnedy, J.,
Episcopal Academy vs. Freize, 2 Watts, 16.
2 The same view was taken of the difference between a cdndition contained in the
original deed, and a separate unrecorded mortgage, in Irvine vs. Campbell, 6 Binn.
120, per Tilghman, C. J. And it is there put upon the ground that the condition
in the deed was notice to the purchaser.
a Anwerter vs. Mathijt, 9 S. & R. 397.
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that such a sale conveys the whole estate of both vendor and ven-
dee in the land, and that consequently the vendor is entitled to
claim the unpaid purchase'money from the fund.1  The vendor is
considered as selling all that estate in the land, whatever it may be,
which he agreed to sell and convey to the defendant. The vendor
being the plaintiff in such case, and the owner of the legal estate,
has the right to agree that such shall be the effect of the sale by
the sheriff, under his judgment; and in order that complete justice
may be done to all concerned, without delay, and with as little ex-
pense as possible, it is right and necessary that the agreement of
the plaintiff to this effect should be implied from his having caused
the land to be-levied on and sold under his judgment. Thelearned
judge then proceeds to comment upon the obvious advantages to be
derived from thQ new doctrine-" By giving this effect to the sale,
complete justice is more likely to be done, perhaps to every one
concerned, than could be had in any other course of proceeding
that Cpould be adopted. It will enable those who have a notion of
buying, to ascertain beforehand, with certainty, the nature, extent,
and value of the estate that is about to be sold, 'which is indispen-
sably necessary, in order to obtain anything near a fair price for it.
The precise nature and extent of the estate being known at the
time of the sale, and it being known also that it is to be sold free,
I Love vs. Jones, 4 Watts, 465. The principle is the same as that which governs
in the sale of land by a mortgagee underajudgment onthe bond accompanying the
mortgage. There, it is said by Gibson, J., in McCall vs. Lenox, 9 S. & . 307,
"With us, the practice has been universal, when the land has been pursued on the
bond, to sell without any reservation of the lien of the mortgage; and the purchaser
is, therefore, always considered as baving acquired the legal as well as the equi-
table estate." And Duncan, J., is still more explicit. He says (9 S. & B. 316) "I
consider the law in PeanyvIrania to stand thus, that on the sale of lands on a judg-
ment on bond, secured by mortgage, by the sheriff, though that judgment is pos-
terior to the execution of the mortgage, the purchaser acquires all the titleof the
mortgpagee, and will hold against all subsequent incumbrances of whatever nature,
mortgages, orjudgments." And afterwards, he repeats, "I deny the right of the
mortgagor to proceed either by sci,' faeias, or ejeetment, to disturb such purchaser
at sheriff's sale, and contend that it is not the equity of redemption (merely) that is
sold, but all the title of the morizaor at the time of the execution of the mort-
gage."
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-and discharged froM all incumubranoes, it is clear that every pose1-
Ile inducement which can be afftrded in a oath sale, is held out by
ihib course, to encourage p~erson disposed to -buy, to give the fall
vaue :ltf the -estate.. The -ale -being thus eteted :under'regulatioms
itittd to Abtain, as -it -ould seem, the .highest possible prise for the
,land, it only remains, in order to effectuate justice, that the money
w price ehould be -distributed am6ng the parties, according to the
priority of their respective liens. That the claim of the -vendor to
-the -fipaid purchase -money, if he has any lien at all as vendor,
-stands first in the list of liens, and must, therefore, be paid in
preference to all-others, cannot be questioned; after this, all -other
liens must be -aid according -to the priority of their respective dates.
Principles -of policy as -well as justice, -seimn -to favor and support
-this doctrine strongly: because, while it seiures to all -parties the
foll benefit of their respective rights, it gives to the vendor, by-one
action -alone, all that hecould obtain otherwise by two, or more, in
-many instances. For if, after obtaining his judgment for the re-
-covery of the purchase morey remaining unpaid, it were to be held
-that he could have nothing sold under it but the vendee's equitable
interest in the land, and that the proceeds thereof must be appro-
-priated first to the satisfaction of all liens thereon, prior in date to that
of the vendor's judgment, and growing out of the acts of the vendee;
and the money arising from the sheriff's sale should, from this or
any other cause, prove insu~cient to satisfy the vendor's claim, he
must then, if the vendee be without other means to satisfy his judg-
ment, have recourse to the action of ejectment in order to get the
land back."' The learned judge then suggests other complications
which might occur if any other effect than the one recommended,
were given to a sale under the judgment of a vendor.
Notwithstanding the obvious advantages of the doctrine settled
in Love vs. Jones, the court in the subsequent case of Day vs. Low-
neP established a distinction in the case where the vendor becomes
himself the purchaser at.the sheriff's sale, under his own judgment,
and held on the authority of Purviance vs. Lemmon, s and Chew vs.
Mather's Administrators,' (both prior to Love vs. Jones) that this
I Love vs. Jones, 4 Watts, 472. 2 5 Watts, 412.
3 16 Serg. & Rawle, 292. 4 1 Pa. Rep. 474.
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rescinds the contract, and the vendor having before the legal, now
acquires the equitable estate, and, having lost all remedy for the
unpaid residue of the purchase money, must come upon the fund
arising from the sheriff's sale for the amount of his judgment, in
preference to the intervening creditors of the vendee. So far Day
vs. Lowrie agrees in effect with Love vs. Jones, but the learned
judge (Sergeant) who delivered the opinion of the court, goes on to
say, "Had a third person purchased, the prior judgment creditors
of the vendee would have been first entitled to payment from the
proceeds of the sale, because the equitable estate would still subsist
and remain liable to the original vendor in the hands of the new
Purchaser."' And Wilson vs. oe,2 which was the case of a pur-
chase by a stranger at a sheriff's sale, under the judgment of a ven-
dor for unpaid purchase money, was decided in accordance with this
dictum of Mr. Justice Sergeant. In that case Chief Justice Gib-
son said, "When the vendor sold it (the equitable interest of vendee)
by execution, 4e sold not his legal title along with it, and a suppo-
sition that he did is the root of the fallacy. The execution was
levied not on the fee, but on the vendee's interest in it; for no man
willingly sells his own estate on his own execution." 3
However curious it might be to examine the authorities cited,
and ascertain how far they sustain the positions of the courtin Day
vs. Lowyie, and Wilson vs. Stoxe, it is no longer necessary, for in
Horbach vs. Biley4 the court overruled Wilson vs. Stoxe, and ex-
ploded the distinction taken in Day vs. Lowrie, between the pur-
chase at the sheriff's sale by the vendor and by a stranger. In this
case the opinion of the court was delivered by Rogers, J., who says,
"It would be no difficult matter to reconcile the cases of Wilson vs.
Stoxe, and Day vs. Lowrie, as one was a purchase by a stranger,
and the other by the vendor; but we are willing to admit that the
distinction is rather plausible than sound; that the law is the same
whether the property be purchased by one or the other." His
honor then proceeds to make a rather extraordinary admission. "It
must be remarked that in Wilson vs. Stoxe, Day vs. Lowrie was
not cited on the argument, and that although Love vs. Jones was
1 5 Watts, 417. 2 10 Watts, 434. 3 10 Watts, 437. 4 7 Barr, 81.
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ited,'yet it i8 nobhdre noticed in the opinion- of the court."' He
tontinues, "The groundwork of that opinion is, that by the sale,
the .vendor's title did not -aps to the sheriff's vendee. Granting
ti-epositibn* thdre is no gainsaiug'theiconclusion. * * * * But
intthis (position) the court was ifi error; "fbr that the vendee under
uch circumstances acquires the legal as well as the equitable estate
had been ruled in the two eases cited.2 I have some reason to 1e-
lieve that'we-were'misled by the dictum of Mr. Justice Sergeant,
i .Day vs. Lowrie, who did not advert to. the decision 'in love vs.
ones." -His honor then cites, with approbation, portions of the
opinion in Love vs, Jones, which are given above somewhat at length;
aind concludes his quotations thus : "This case is precisely in point,
and explodes the distinction between a purchase by a stranger aiid
by the vendor, and had it been cited'in Day vs. Lowrie, we shoula
have been spared the dictum of Mr. Justice Sergeant; and had
both cases been adverted to in Wilion vs. Stoxe, we should never
have been troubled with this case." 3
- The doctrine that'a sale on the judgment of the vendor against
the vendee, under the articles, conveys the whole united interest of
vendor and vendee, and leaves the vendor to resort for the unpaid
purchase money to the fund arising therefrom, may, after all its
fluctuations, be considered as settled for the prbsent, inasmuch as
the court in a recent case' in the last volume of Harris's Reports;
went considerably out of their way to express their approbation of
it, and nothing is found in the two volumes (1st and 2d Casey)
Which have appeared since, to indicate any change of opinion.
- It was said at the commencement of this article, that in Pennsyl-
vania the whole of defendant's freehold lands, which were in his
possession at the time of the judgment, are bound by it. This is
true, not only of his lands but of any legal title, contingent or
IThat is to say, the court overruled a point decided, after full discussion, in a
former case, without once adverting to the fact, perhaps withoiir being aware of it,
that the point had ever been raised or settled.
Love vs. Jones, 4 Watts, 465; Day vs. Lowrie, 5 Watts, 412.
7 Barr, 83. 4 Vierheller's Appeal, 12 Harris, 105.
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otherwise, in lands where there is a real interest vested in the debtor
at the time of the judgment, though unaccompanied by possession.'
Thus the legal title retained by the vendor, under articles of
agreement for the sale of lands, is bound to the extent of his inte-
rest at the time of the judgment. And on a sale under such judg-
ment, the sheriff's vendee stands precisely in the situation of the
original vendor, anAi may bring ejectment for the unpaid purchase
money.
2
And the lien of a judgment against the vendor upon the unpaid
purchase money, is not divested by a sheriff's sale of the original
vendee's interest.3  And judgments against the vendor and vendee
by different creditors, bind the rights of each, and after a sale by
the sheriff under such judgments, the purchasers stand towards each
other in the relation of the original vendor and vendee.'
So the interest of a widow in the real estate of her deceased
husband, which has been put by our Act of April 19th, 1794, upon
the footing of a rent charge, is bound by a judgment against her.5
And this, whether she takes under a will, or the statute of distri-
bution. And her right to dower is bound by a judgment obtained
before assignment. 6
A husband's curtesy in his wife's lands is likewise such an inte-
rest as may be bound by a judgment against him; and the birth of
issue is not necessary, under our act, in order to give him a tenancy
by the curtesy initiate which may be bound. And where lands to
which the wife is co-heiress, have been ordered to be appraised in
proceedings in partition, but have not been sold or accepted by the
3 Lessee of Humphreys vs. Humphreys, 1 Yates, 429.
2 M'3lullen vs. Wenner, 16 S. & R. 18; Stewart vs. Coder, 1 Jones, 20. Itmight
be a curious question whether, if a vendor should, after a judgment against him,
bring ejectment against the vendee and dispossess him, the judgment would bind
the recovered lands. In Richter vs. Selin (8 S. & R. 425) it was decided that a judg-
ment against an equitable interest in lands, expands in order to embrace the'subse-
quently acquired legal interest, and it is difficult to see why the same should not
hold in the converse case. The case of Stewart vs. Coder, 1 Jones, 90, which de-
cides that a judgment against the vendor is a lien upon the unpaid purchase money,
seems to settle the point, for the recovered land would certainly stand in the place
of the unpaid instalments.
3 Creigh vs. Shatto, 9 W. & S. 82. 4 Chahoon vs. Hollenback, 16S. & R. 425.
s Shaupo vs. Shaupe, 12 S. & I. 12. 6 Thomas vs. Simpson, 3 Barr, 69.
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other heirs at the date of the judgment against the husband, his
estate in them is bound, and this lien continues against securities
given for the wife's share of the valuation.'
So a vested remainder to take effect upon the determination of a
life estate, is bound by a judgment against the remainderman.2
In the case of Ammant vs. The New Alezandria and Pittsburg
Tkrnpike Co.,3 however, the court decided that under the charter,
no interest in the land that could be subject to execution, was con-
ferred upon the company, but only a right to enter upon land for
the purpose of constructing a road and to take tolls, and that, there-
fore, the road could not be taken in execution, as "the defendants
had no tangible interest---nothing which could be delivered by the
sheriff to a purchaser under the execution. There was no rent or
profit of any kind issuing out of land; nothing but a right to re-
ceive toll for horses, carriages, &c., passing over the land. Every
kind of right of license granted by the act of Assembly, was con-
fined to the company. They alone were confided in. They alone
were looked to for a faithful performance of the important duties
incumbent opL them. * * * * There is nothing in the incorporat-
ing act which authorizes the company to transfer their right to other
persons; and such transfer would certainly be inconsistent with the
whole design and object of the law. * * * If a turnpike confpany
has a right to land or other property not on the road, there is no
reason why it should not be subject to an execution. ' 4 Upon this, the
court, in the subsequent case of Leedom vs. The Plymouth B. B. 0o.,5
grounded their decision that the right of taking tolls by a road
company from passengers and freights, is a species of incorporeal
hereditament incident to the road which cannot be bound by a judg-
ment. They say,' "The plaintiff could claim a priority out of the
tolls collected, only on the ground that his judgment gave him a
lien upon them. To hav.e this effect, he must make out that these
tolls were such an interest in land existing in the corporation at the
I Lancaster Bank vs. Stauffer, 10 Barr, 898.
2 Lessee of Humphreys vs. Humphreys, 1 Yates, 429.
s 13 S. & R. 210.
' Per Tilghman, C. J. 6 5 Watts & Sergeant, 265. 6 Per Sergeant, J.
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time when the judgment was rendered, as to be bound by it. The
road itself could not be taken in execution, (here the learned judge
cites the case given above) and for the same reason is not bound by
a judgment: much less is the right of taking tolls from passengers
and freights, which is a corporate franchise-a species of incorpo-
real hereditament incident to the road. 2 Black. Comm. 38."
And in pursuance of the spirit of these decisions which is, "that
privileges granted to corporations to construct turnpike roads,
canals, &c., are conferred with a view to the public use and accom-
modation, and that they cannot voluntarily deprive themselves of
the lands and real estate and franchises which are necessary for
that purpose; nor can they be taken from them by execution and
sold by a creditor, because to permit it would tend to defeat the
whole object of the charter, by taking the improvements out of the
hands of the corporation and destroying their use and benefit,"'
the court decided in The Susquehanna Canal Company vs.
Bouhanz that the toll-houses of a company, though not directly on
the line of their works, cannot be taken in execution.
Even a contingent title to land accompanied with a real interest-
is bound by a judgment. Thus, where a grantor conveys land to
trustees on a charitable use, expressly reserving to himself, his
heirs and assigns, a right of entry on condition broken, he has such
an interest remaining in the land as is the subject of levy and sale
on execution, even before a breach of the condition : and on such
breach afterwards occurring, the sheriff's vendee may enter.3 And
where a lease was made to one and his heirs for forty-nine years,
reserving to the lessee the privilege of building, with a covenant by
the lessor to purchase the improvements at the end of the term, or
convey to the lessee, his heirs and assigns, the land at a valuation,
and the lessee afterwards erected valuable buildings, it was held
that he had such an interest in the premises as was bound by a
judgment.4
But the contingent interest liable to be bound by a judgment
must be of freehold; hence a lease to one, his executors and ad-
' Per Sergeant, 3. 9 watts & Serg. 28. 2 9 Watts & Serg. 27.
3A'Kissick vs. Pickle, 4 Harris, 140. 'Ely vs. Beaumont, 5 S. & R. 124.
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ministrators for twelve months, and so from year to year as long as
both parties please, with a covenant not to assign without the special
license of the lessor, and a proviso that, if the lessor determine the
lease, the improvements of the lessee are to be paid for after their
value is ascertained in a certain way, does not vest any title to the
freehbld in the lessee, so as to subject his interest to the lien of a
judgment." The distinction between these two cases as explained
b' Huston J. in Krause's Appeal is that in the former the lessee
had a contingent interest in the realty dependent upon the failure
'of the lessor to compensate him for his improvemeits, while in the
latter there was no such interest in the land but a mere right to
compensation in money. The first being an interest in the land,
however remote, could be bound by a judgment, the latter, being
mere personalty, could not.
: So a contingent estate in realty, limited by executory devise, is
subject to the libn of a judgment, and may be levied on and sold
duriiig the continuance of the previous estate.2
But a judgment against a trustee is no lien upon his bare legal
title.' And a limitation in a deed of trust of a contingent per-
centage on the trust fund as a compensation to the trustee does not
create such an interest in him, as to subject the trust estate to an
execution for his debts.' Though if the trust be accompanied with
a beneficial interest in the subject matter this is an estate in the
trustee which will be bound by a judgment against him."
But not only is every legal estate of freehold vested in the de-
fendant at the time of the judgment bound by it, in Pennsylvania;
the lien of the judgment in this State embraces also every kind of
equitable interest in lands. This anomaly in- our practice has
arisen from the want of a court of equity here (owing to the jeal-
ousy of chancery powers and forms always entertained by our legis-
latures from the origin of the colony) and the consequent necessity
imposed on the common law courts, of attaining the ends of justice,
SKrause's Appeal, 2 Wharton, '398. 2 De Hoas vs. Bunn, 2 Barr, 335.
'Reed's Appeal, 1 Harris, 478. 4 Ashurst vs. Given, 5 IV. & S. 323.
5 Drysdale's Appeal, 3 Harris, 457.
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in cases of equity jurisdiction, through the medium of common
law forms whenever possible. -In England the lien of a judgment
does not attach to any equitable estate, but there the creditor may
have relief through the court of chancery; here we have no such
resort, and our courts have therefore, from necessity, established it
as a principle, that both judgments and executions have an imme-
diate operation on equitable estates, and on the venddioni the
sheriff sells and conveys all the debtor's right, such as it may be.,
The interest of a vendee under articles of agreement for the sale
of land has already been seen to be bound by a judgment against
him. But the extent of the interest so bound has been the subject
of much discussion in our courts. The principles settled in numer-
ous decisions are briefly these: Written articles of agreement for
the sale of lands vest immediately an equitable estate in the vendee
which will be bound by a subsequent judgment against him if the
contract is afterwards executed, though no part of the purchase
money had been paid nor possession given at the date of the judg-
ment- and as the interest of vendee is enlarged by successive pay-
ments of the purchase money or the paying off of prior incum-
brances, the lien of the judgment expands so as to include the
enlarged interest.3  And consequently, when the title of the vendee
1 Carkhuff vs. Andersoh, 3 Binn. 9, per Tilghman, C. J.; Anwerter vs. Mathiot,
9 S. & R. 397; Lynch vs. Dearth, 2 Pa. R. 101; Carneghan vs. Brewster, 2 Barr,
41; Thomas vs. Simpson, 3 Barr, 60. So an improvement right may be levied on
and sold at sheriff's sale, and the purchaser may continue and complete the settle-
ment by means of a tenant in possession. Myers vs. Myers, 8 Watts, 430.
2 Stephens' Appeal, 8 W. &.S. 186.
3Stephens' Appeal.-The inconvenience which would result from the opposite
rule, that each judgment binds only the interest of the vendee actually existing at
the time it was obtained, and the confusion which would arise in the case of differ-
ent judgments obtained against the purchaser of an estate payable by instalments
was clearly foreshadowed by Duncan, J. in Richter vs. Selin, 8 S. & R. 425. The
rule which now obtains, that each judgment binds the interest at the time it was
obtained, and has the benefit of all subsequent payments up to the time of the
sheriff's sale (which disposes of the vendee's whole existing estate together with
his equitable right to demand a conveyance upon the completion of the payments)
is intelligible and just, inasmuch as it allows all the judgments to come upon the
fund in the sheriff's hands in the order of their priority, without complicating the
distribution of the proceeds by any question as to the amount which had been paid
at the date of each judgment.
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is perfected by payment and a conveyance, the judgment binds the
whole legal and equitable estate which are now united.' Afortiori
it follows that when there has been a part performance of the con-
tract contained in the written articles, either by payment of a por-
tion of the purchase money, or by taking possession of the land,
the vendee has an equity which will be bound by a subsequent
judgment.
2
But a mere oral agreement to purchase land does not vest an
estate until it is executed, nor is mere payment of a portion of the
purchase money such an execution of such an agreement, as will
vest in the vendee an equitable estate which can be bound by a
judgment.3 Though delivery of possession of land, in pursuance of
a parol contract, amounts to a part performance, and the vendee as
well as the vendor may insist on specific execution of the contract.
Hence if in such case, one authorized by the vendor to deliver the
possession to the vendee takes a lease of the land from the vendee
and enters into actual possession, there is an equitable estate in the
lessor which is bound by a judgment against him.4
A judgment may therefore bind an equitable or even an inchoate
interest in lands, but that interest must be an estate in the lands
themselves. The interest of a mortgagee, judgment creditor, owner
of a legacy charged on land, creditor of an-intestate estate, me-
chanic or material-man, or of a preferred creditor under an assign-
ment to trustees (to whom the land is debtor) is not the subject of
judgment, for these are interests not in land but in the proceeds of
land.5 Hence the interest of a devisee in lands ordered by the will
1 Richter vs. Selin, 8 S. & R. 425; Morrison vs. Wurtz, 7 Watts, 437.
2 Lynch vs. Dearth, 2 Pa. R. 101; Hartman vs. Stahl, Ib. ,223; The Episcopal
Academy vs. Frieze, 2 Watts, 16; Catlin vs. Robinson, Ib. 373; Baird vs. Lent, 8
Watts, 423; Foster's Appeal, 3 Barr, 80; a sale by the sheriff is attended with the
ordinary consequences of a sale by an individual, Stoever vs. Rice, 3 Wharton, 24,
hence a purchaser at a sheriff's sale before his deed has been acknowledged has an
inceptive interest in the land, by the contract, which may be bound by the lien of
a judgment, Morrison vs. Wurtz, 7 Watts, 437.
3 Miller vs. Specht, 1 Jones, 456.
4 Pugh vs. Good, 3 W. & S. 56; and see also Anwerter vs. Mathiot, 9 S. & R. 397;
Chahoon vs. Hollenback, 16 S. & R. 425.
6 Per Gibson, C. J. in Morrow vs. Brenizer, 2 Rawle, 188.
LIEN OF JUDGMENT-WHAT IT BINDS.
to be sold, and the proceeds or a portion thereof paid over to him,
is not bound by a judgment obtained against him, because the lega-
tees have no estate in the lands themselves but only in the execution
of the trust and in the proceeds arising therefrom.' But the lega-
tees, where proceeds of land to be sold are directed by the will to
be divided among them, may elect to take the land instead of the
proceeds of the sale, and after such electionit becomes the subject
of lien, and may be sold upon a judgment.2  So where a house and
lot were devised by a father to trustees in trust to pay over the
rents to his son during life, and after the son's death to his ap-
pointees, or in default of appointment to his heirs, with powers to
the trustees and son conjointly to change the investment and also
to convey the property to the son absolutely in case he is relieved
from embarrassment ; it was held that the son took no estate in the
land that could be bound by a judgment.3 Upon the same grounds
it was decided in Kramer vs..Arthurs & _ichol8on, 4 that a member
of a partnership established for the purpose of dealing in land has
no interest in the land itself but merely a resulting interest in the
proceeds, and that it is not so bound by a judgment for his separate
debt, that it could be pursued in the hands of a vendee, though a
sale on a judgment of a partnership creditor, while the title still
remained in the partnership, would pass the lands, whether as such,
or as chattels; and a joint stock company dealing in lands is virtu-
ally a partnership.5
But where a person has not merely a beneficial interest in the
proceeds of the land but is also the possessor of the legal title as
sole trustee for himself and others, he has such an estate in the land
as will be bound by a judgment against him, and on a sale in pur-
suance of the power by a trustee substituted in his place, the judg-
ment creditor of the original trustee is entitled to be paid out of the
proceeds in preference to one to whom the original trustee had
assigned his interest subsequent to the judgment.6
IAllison vs. Wilson's Executors, 13 S. & R. 330; Morrow vs. Brenizer, 2 Rawle,
188; Selfridge's Appeal, 9 W. & S. 55; Stuck vs. Mackey, 4 I. & S. 196.
2 Stuck vs Mackey, supra. 3 Vaux vs. Parke, 7 W. & S. 19. 4 7 Barr, 165.
5 Kramer vs. Arthurs and Nicholson, 7 Barr, 165.
6 Drysdale's Appeal, 3 Harris, 457.
